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Abstract: The objective of this investigation is to study the role that the narrative speech act plays in relation to 
the acquisition of certain types of knowledge within the frame of argumentative processes. An inferential scheme 
that regulates the acquisition of knowledge is exposed, as well as an analysis of the reasons adduced. This is used 
to develop an evaluative method for the argumentative “goodness” of narrative texts. Finally, the particular case of 
literary narratives is analysed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the question of how to analyze the process of acquisition of knowledge by narratives, when 
acting as reasons within an argumentation. The first part of the paper (Section 2) deals with the epistemological 
background needed in order to fulfill this task. The relations between narrative and epistemology are studied from 
the perspective of the knowledge acquired by testimony and the concept of basic knowledge. The second part of 
the paper presents an explanation of the process by which knowledge is acquired in argumentations when 
narratives are used as reasons. An inferential scheme is presented in order to systematize this phenomenon. The 
third part of the article is about the assessment of the performance of narratives when acting in the course of an 
argumentation. The last part of the article deals briefly with the particular case of literary narratives. 
 
2. Knowledge and narrative 
 
In this section, I will discuss some aspects about the relations between knowledge and narrative. In order to do so, 
some  epistemological notions and assumptions have to be presented. 
 People acquire beliefs about the world through belief sources. If these sources are reliable, it become 
knowledge sources, from which people can acquire knowledge. The problem of the criterion (Cohen, 2002), 
which deals with the problem of the need of a priori knowledge about the reliability of the source in order to 
acquire knowledge from it, generates great controversy. The theoretical commitments I will present later make 
clear the position I am holding in relation to it. 
 Once the background is settled, I should like to make several remarks about the nature of the kinds of 
knowledge that are susceptible to be acquired from narrative. These kinds of knowledge partially concicide with 
the so-called knowledge by testimony. 
 The traditional belief sources considered in epistemology are perception, memory and induction (Cohen, 
2002). Less frequently studied, instrospection is also an accepted one. And the last one is testimony. It is often—
and, in my view, mistakenly— considered as second-rate source, as it provides second-hand beliefs: those arriving 
to their destiny through someone else (O’Brien, 2006). However, and this is why I think testimony is a pure first-
rate kind of knowledge, it is a very frequent source of knowledge. Whenever we come to believe facts like Patrick 
Modiano won a Nobel Prize—when we hear it on the radio—, or that we were born on a shniny morinng—when 
our mother tells us—, we are acquiring beliefs by testimony. We are persistently acquiring knowledge by 
testimony, and in some of these cases, testimony is a piece of narrative. 
 Despite the role of the epistemology of testimony is not the main one of this paper, some theoretical 
commitments about this field have to be made. Firstly, I will face the dichotomy “testimony as an intentional 
activity on the part of the speaker […] [versus] testimony as a source of belief or knowledge for the hearer” 
(Lackey, 2006) p.187) in favour of the second option1. Consequently, I am going to adopt the definition of 
testimony Jennifer Lackey (2006) calls Hearer Testimony: 
 
1I am interested in what actually counts as testimony rather on what is intended to do so. According to that, and as my 
focus is on written narrative, I choose to follow Gadamer’s hermeneutical spirit. His views about the lack of relevance 
 S testifiesh that p by making an act of communication a if and only if H, S’s hearer, reasonably takes a 
as conveying the information that p (in part) in virtue of a’s communicative content. (Lackey, 2006, 
p.190) 
 
 Hearer testimony allows to emphasize the role of the addresee of a communicative act. By doing so, it makes 
possible to study the relations between knowledge by testimony, narrative and argumentation from a 
perlocutionary point of view, as it will be done in the subsequent sections. As Lackey states, the illocutionary 
force with which the addresser loads a testimony as performing its emission does not make any much difference: 
“[Testimonyh] can serve as a source of belief or knowledge for others, regardless of the testifier’s intention to be 
such an epistemic source”. (p.189) 
 It is also important to remark that I am referring to what M. Welbourne and C.A.J. Coady (Welbourne & 
Coady, 1994) call natural testimony. This expression refers to testimony offered in daily life circumstances, 
without any technical or specifical requirements—unlike formal testimony, which refers to situations like 
“statements offered under oath in a courtroom or commission of inquiry”. (p.178) So, in this paper, by testimony I 
mean hearer, natural testimony. 
 With respect to narrative, in his Narratology: The Form and Function of Narrative, Gerald Prince 
(1982, p. 4) presents the following definition “the representation of at least two real or fictive events 
or situations in a time sequence,  neither of which presupposes or entails the other”. In this paper, I 
will assume Prince’s definition. The alluded representation, in my view, will be made of certain 
speech-acts, wether of fiction-making (García-Carpintero, 2016) or non fiction-making (Romero 
Álvarez, 1996). 
 On the ground of the previous remarks, it is easy to identify testimony with non-fiction narrative. Testimony 
refers to people making communication—speech—acts in order to convey some information, while narrative is 
related with the representation of some events—by communicative means: speech-acts. In the case of testimony, 
the addressee takes the addresser as reasonably conveying some information. If we assume, as it is usually 
understood, that ‘information’ refers to some data about the real world, the equivalence is assured. 
 In order to accommodate fiction narrative into this analysis, some additional remarks are needed. In her 
article Is there a specific sort of knowledge from fictional works?, M.J. Alcaraz León (2016) states that there is 
evidence about the capacity of fiction for conveying knowledge. But, she defends, there is not anything 
specifically fictional in the features that enhace this epistemic value: “if we look at the reasons that […] reinforce 
the idea that fiction possess cognitive value, none of them show that the fictional character […] is playing a 
significant role in the constitution of these values”. (p.40) She defends that what explain the power of fiction for 
conveying certain kinds of knowledge has to do with “the representational means used to prodice a work” (p.40), 
and that the common misunderstanding about the epistemic specificity of fiction is based on the historical effort—
in terms of “modulating the expressive and cognitive virtues of each representational medium” (p.38)—that artists 
have made in producing fiction. 
 Based on these observations, it can be stated that, although fiction narrative doesn’t fit into the paradigm of 
testimony—unlike non-fiction narrative—, its epistemic values coincide. 
 Regarding the structural relation between testimony/non-fiction narrative and fiction narrative, some 
comments have to be made. The basic idea I endorse was expressed by J.L. Austin (1962) in relation with the 
circumstances required for issuing an utterance: “We […] must bear in mind the possibility of ‘etiolation’ as it 
occurs when we use speech in acting, fiction and poetry, quotation and recitation” (p.92). 
 In this line, M. García-Carpintero (2007, 2016) explains fiction as a kind of speech-act that fulfills certain 
conditions. In order to provide a theoretical ground, he presents his account of assertion—also modelled as an 
speech-act—, based on the constitutive “Knowledge Transmission Rule”. According to it, asserting a proposition 
consists in uttering it in a way such that an intended audience is put in a position to know that  proposition. On its 
basis, an analogue constitutive rule is presented, in order to define his account of fiction: 
 
[…] to fiction-make a proposition by uttering something (or painting, or having people acting on stage, 
and so forth) is to so utter with the communicative intention to put an intended audience in a position to 
make believe (imagine) that proposition. (2007, p.204) 
 
 According to that, the point of fictioning is to imagine, that is, to know (or pretend to know, or acting as if 
one is knowing) certain things about an possible world, different from the real one. So, it is reasonable to 
 
that the author’s intentions have in relation with the actual meaning of a text can be condensed in the following quote: 
“Not occasionally only, but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author. That is why understanding is not 
merely a reproductive, but always a productive attitude as well.” (Gadamer, 1975, p.264) 
understand fiction narrative (a narrative about a possible world) as the representation of a narrative about the real 
world—that is, the representation of a testimony. In conclusion, it has been shown that the epistemic values 
associated to testimonies—non-fiction narratives— and representations of testimonies—fiction narratives—
coincide. 
 Once narrative has been properly accomodated into the field of epistemology of testimony, some theoretical 
commitments have to been made. It will provide some technical insights from epistemology that will allow me to 
precise the kind/s of knowledge suitable to be acquired through narrative. 
 The first matter about which I am shall to take sides is if knowledge by testimony is inferential or non-
inferential.  According to the remarks presented by Daniel O’Brien (2006), there are a number of non-inferentialist 
views that I support, although an inferentialist concession has also to be assumed. 
 I defend that testimonial knowledge can be acquired in a direct way. An inferential and non exclusively 
testimonial chain—or web— justifying a testimony is not a neccesary condition to acquire knowledge by it. 
 In consequence, I also support the idea that testimonial knowledge can be a type of basic knowledge. The 
notion of basic knowledge I use is the one addressed by O’Brien: “one whose epistemic credentials do not rely on 
another (more basic) form of knowledge.” (p.6) Other occounts of basic knowledge, like the one by Stweart 
Cohen (2002) also fit into the position I am holding: knowledge provided to an addressee by a belief source, prior 
that to the knowledge (by the addressee) that the belief source is reliable and, consequently, is actually a 
knowledge source2. 
 In this line, knowledge acquired from testimony constitutes basic knowledge in some specific situations. The 
first one happens when a testimony yields knowledge directly, without appealing to another kinds, like perception, 
memory, etc. The second one consists in testimonies justified by an exclusively testimonial inferential chain, 
which first step is reliable enough to generate knowledge. And, consequently, so does it the final one. 
 As I stated before, there is also an inferential-style argument I also admit. Inferential chains of finite length, 
composed only by testimonial steps are an existing and valid way to achieve testimonial knowledge—as I have 
outlined above. As the inferential jumps that compose this kind of chains are supported by reasoning proccesses, 
this position contradicts genuine non-inferential views like the following one, presented by O’Brien: “if one does 
have to admite the ability to reason thus, such an ability does not play a justificatory role.”(p.6) 
 The last subject about which I should possitionate my view is about whether knowledge by testimony is of an 
internal or external nature. In order to illustrate my position, let’s consider that some addressee A acquires 
knowledge K from a source S (an addresser of a testimony), without A having acquired previously the knowledge 
KS, about the reliability of the source. An internalist view would deny the viability of this situation, while an 
externalist one would accept it. (O’Brien, 2006) 
 I am holding an externalist position, as I don’t think that the addressee’s prior knowledge of  KS is a 
neccesary condition for the her acquisition of K. 
 Neither is it necessary, for the addresser associated to S, to know KS prior to stating it.  What it is necessary, I 
defend, is the reliability of the source—its “epistemic quiality” (O’Brien, 2006, p.8)—, in an ontological level. 
According to this views, acquiring knowledge by testimony seems rather similar to dying by a shot into the air. 
Neither the shooter’s intention to facilitate the death nor the potential victim’s one are necessary conditions for the 
event, although both of them may help. 
 In conclusion, in this chapter narrative has been accomodated into the field of the epistemology of testimony. 
Thus, some technical characteristics of knowledge by testimony can be applied to narrative. Among them, it can 
be stated that knowledge acquired through narrative is a type of basic knowledge 
  
 
3. How is this knowledge acquired? 
 
In this paper, argumentation is understood in the line of Lilian Bermejo-Luque’s Linguistic Normative Model of 
Argumentation (2011). According to it, argumentation is modelled as a second order speech-act complex, 
composed of the constative speech-act of adducing (i.e., the reason) and the constative speech-act of concluding 
(i.e., the conclusion) (Bermejo-Luque, 2011: 60-62). This speech-act complex presents an illocutionary force, 
which amounts to trying to show that the conclusion is correct, and a characteristic perlocutionary effect, that 
consist on inviting to infer the conclusion, on the basis of the adduced reasons. In the case when the addresser, by 
means of her speech-act of arguing,  successes in showing that the conclusion is correct—which requires the 
accomplishment of certain semantic and pragmatic conditions (Bermejo-Luque, 2011: 186-194) —, then she is 
justifying the conclusion. 
 The relation among the concepts of argument, argumentation, inference and reasoning is the following: 
reasonings (mental processes) and argumentations (communicative processes) consist on inferences that ground 
 
2Basic knowledge according to Cohen’s view is also a type of basic knowledge in O’Brien’s (traditional) view. (Cohen, 
2006, p. 310) 
the acceptation of some beliefs based on other beliefs. The syntactic and semantic properties of these inferences 
are represented by means of arguments.   
 Bermejo-Luque’s (2011) notion of correctness is the following one: 
 
 […] We will take a claim to be correct if we think of the (ontological or epistemical) 
 qualifier that represents the type and degree of pragmatic force with which this claim  has  
been put forward as the one by means of which this claim should have been put  forward. (p.62) 
  
 A claim is correct if its pragmatic force is adjusted with respect to both the real world and an ideal3. Despite 
how interesting is the analysis between the level of correctness of a claim and its quality with respect to make its 
addressee acquire some knowledge, it is beyond the scope of this study. I will only rely on the commonly accepted 
assumption that the more correct a claim is, the more accurate is the representation of the world it offers and, 
consequently, the more knowledge about the real world it generates. 
 In order to believe a conclusion, the addressee should believe both the reason and the inference that lead to it. 
When an arguer wants to show the correctness of her point of view, she has to look for reasons and inferences that 
can help her to justify it. If she finds a reason that contributes to this task but needs additional support, the next 
thing she should do is to find a new reason that fully justifies the previous one—and, transitively, the original 
point of view, or desired conclusion—. If it doesn’t do it completely, the chain will continue growing in length. 
Each reason constitutes a partial conclusion whose correctness has to be proved by the next reason to find. The 
relations between these steps are hold by the inferences that lead from one to the next. 
 As infinite-lenght chains of inferences are not sufficient to achieve evidence abut the correctness of the 
original conclusion to prove, there must be a final step, an inference whose reasons are good enough to stop 
inferring.This precise step would be the last to be found, but the first one in relation with the order relationship 
determined by the direction of the inferential chain.   
 In argumentative contexts like the one that has been described, narratives can be used as reasons. They 
exhibit a great justificatory and persuasive power, which comes from their effectiveness in making an addressee 
acquire particular pieces of knowledge or belief. This issue has been explained in Section 2, in relation with the 
fact that knowledge by narrative can constitute a kind of basic knowledge. This means that certain4 pieces of 
knowledge acquired through narrative can perform the role of the first step of an inferential chain—altough it 
would be the last one at being found, as it was mentioned above—, as its epistemic credentials does not depend on 
any other kinds of knowledge. 
 This topic of the “last reason” has been widely discussed in Argumentation Theory literature. In their The 
New Rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca stated that “Argumentation [...] must convince the reader that the 
reasons adduced are of a compelling character, that they are self-evident [...]” (1969, p. 32) The “self-evident” 
characteristic Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca demanded to reasons coincides with the basic nature of the 
knowledge achieved by certain narratives. It is evident now that these particular narratives can become “good 
reasons”. 
 To this point, the role of inferential chains  should be detailed. The relation between an argumentative 
process and an an inferential chain comes from the already discussed one between argumentation and reasoning. 
The first one is a communicative process, while the last one is of an internal nature. Both of them relies on 
inferences that allow the jump from some beliefs to another ones. According to this, the mentioned inferential 
chain, motivated by the utterance of the characteristic speech-acts of the argumentation, leads a cognitive process: 
a reasoning. This one goes from the piece of basic knowledge acquired through the first reason of the chain to the 
derived knowledge associated to the conclusion—altough not necessarily in a direct way: several steps may be 
needed to justify the conclusion. 
 The expression ‘inferential web’ has also been used, because any of the forementioned steps is isolated. All 
of them are supported by a web of auxiliary inferences—which refer to contexts (Sperber, 2000), sources, etc. In 
order to explain this situation, some remarks about direct and indirect judgements (Bermejo-Luque, 2011, p.73-
75) should be done. 
 When reviewing all the possible ways of “coming to believe new things” (2011, p.75), Bermejo-Luque 
clasifies it among direct judgements, indirect judgements and “judgements prompted by other judgements in a 
non-inferential way”. Direct judgementes correspond to judgements that have not been yield by any other 
 
3This meaning is derived from the last part of the tefinition: “[…] this claim should have been put forward.” The 
expression “should have been put forward” makes a reference to an ideal world in which both qualifiers coincide. 
In this way, this notion of correctness evaluates the similarity bewteen the pragmatic conditions in which the 
addresser of a claim puts it forward and an ideal set of conditions in which it “should” be uttered. 
4The issue about which narratives are good enough ones when they are working as reasons in argumentative contexts 
will be studied in Section 4, appealing to the notion of “good reasons”, by Walter Fisher. (1987) 
judgement. The author exemplifies this type has recalling that empirical knowledge is often derived from direct 
judgements. 
 However, she refuses to label this kind of judgement as ‘non-inferential’. As she states: 
 
In the philosophical literature, this kind of judgment is usually called “non-inferential”; 
however I would rather call it “direct” because I would like to leave aside the question of 
whether, in the end, a judgment must be inferentially articulated for it to have any content 
at all. In fact, I am willing to say that (most, or even, all) direct judgments “depend” upon 
previous inferences. […] This association is something that probably depends on many 
inferences had I already made over time. Yet, despite its inferential articulation and 
dependency, I say that this judgment counts as a direct judgment because I didn’t make 
these inferences in order to judge in this particular case […] (p.74) 
 
 The case of inferential webs accommodates into this situation. We could say that the 
auxuliary inferences that support the principal steps of an inferential chain correspond to the 
ones (mentioned by Bermejo-Luque) that are not made to judge in particular cases—but 
conform automatic associations of ideas. As it is stated later, the events that prompt these 
auxiliary inferences should be count as causes rather than reasons. As reasons, they should 
have timeless validity so they could properly justify the associated inference. As causes, 
these events are “sufficient to generate a mental state that did not exist previously” (p.74) 
 On the contrary, indirect judgements are judgements “caused by other judgment(s) or belief(s) 
of the subject that are related to this judgment in an inferential way” (p.75) These judgements 
correspond with the principal steps of the described inferential webs. 
 In conclusion, inferential webs present a structure similar to the external one of a leaf. There is 
a main inference chain that relates several pieces of knowledge (so-called ‘principal steps’—
according to the leaf model, it correspond to each node to which arrive the auxiliary veins) and that 
would play the role of the  midrib of a leaf. There are also a set of auxiliary inferences for each 
principal step, that relate determined causes with it and that would play the role of the auxiliary 
veins of a leaf. The principal steps can also be prompted by other judgements in a non-inferential 
way. 
 It can be noticed that the presented analysis by Bermejo-Luque allude to making judgements and acquiring 
beliefs, while this paper deals with the subject of acquiring knowledge through narrative. So, the relationship 
between judgement, belief and knowledge has to be precised, as these three have been said to 
constitute the pincipal steps of an inference web. With respect to the distinction between belief and 
judgement, Bermejo Luque states that “the difference between a belief and a judgment as a matter 
of the difference between an attitude and an act: whereas believing is having a certain attitude 
towards a given propositional content, judging would be (the act of) presenting to ourselves a given 
propositional content as holding”. (p.74-75) 
To this part, despite the great conceptual difference, it is not difficult no expand an analysis based 
on judgements—the one made by Bermejo-Luque—to an analysis based on beliefs5. It seems 
neccesary, at least in average cases, to have an attitude prior to make an act. Consequently, the 
direct or indirect character of judgements, along with the rest of considerations made with repect to 
them, can be applied to beliefs only by stopping the act of “presenting to ourselves a given 
propositional content as holding” in the very moment of having the so mentioned attitude about this 
same propositional content. 
 Regarding the application of previous analysis to pieces of knowledge, the already made 
theoretical commitment of externalism allows it. The main condition for acquiring knowledge, 
according to the setting presented in Section 2, is the ontological reliability of the source, its 
“epistemic quality”, in O’Brien (2006) terms. Neither the knowledge by the addressee nor the one 
 
5Neither the author pays too much attention to the specificity of her analysis with respect to beliefs or judgements. She 
often expands it to both of them: “Now, let us define “indirect judgment” as a judgment caused by other judg- 
ment(s) or belief(s) of the subject that are related to this judgment in an inferen[tial way.” (p. 75) 
by the addresser, of the reliability of the source is a necessary condition for the acquirement of 
knowledge. In consequence, the distance between judgements, beliefs and knowledge does not 
constitute a problem in order to apply the analysis carried out with respect to the first two to the last. 
  
 
4. Argumentative goodness of narratives 
 
As it has been outlined, narratives can work as reasons, when adduced within the the course of an argumentation. 
In this section, an analysis and an assessment system for these narratives will be developed. 
 The idea of narratives performing as reasons does not t fit in many conceptions of argumentation. These 
conceptions share a view of rhetoric as a mere procedimental discipline, which purpose consist on developing 
some techniques—mostly heuristic—in the line of persuading specific addresees within argumentative contexts. 
Narratives acting as reasons fit in this account as “rhetorical devices”, improving persuasiveness of 
argumentations. 
 There are two different conceptions about the relationship between rhetoric and argumentation. The classic 
one focuses in the persuasive capacity of the argumentation itself, and explains the rhetorical value of any piece of 
text or discourse in terms of persuasion to particular audiences: it is a purely instrumental conception of rhetoric, 
and it has been criticized by authors like Christian Kock (2009) or Lilian Bermejo-Luque (2011: 158-162), due to 
the absence of mention and study of the justificatory character of argumentation. 
 Another conception of the rhetorical, as it is presented in Bermejo-Luque (2011: 148-157), defends that the 
rhetorical properties of any communicative object does not constitute a function of the effect it provokes on 
particular subjects, but of what can be considered as a normal or standard response, coming from a normal or 
standard audience. In this line, in the course of argumentations, rhetoric plays a role in justifying points of view 
rather than merely in persuading particular addressees. That is to say, rhetoric aspects constitute an essential part 
of reasoning. 
 The account that Walter Fisher (1989) presents about the “narrative paradigm” can be inscribed as one of 
these last conceptions. As he asserts: “Reasoning need not to be bound to argumentative prose or to be expressed 
in clear-cut inferential or implicative structures”. (p.57) In this same direction,  he points out further “Rationality 
is determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings” (p. 65) That is, according to him, reasoning does not 
need to be so attached to logic approaches as it has been traditionally, but to other aspects closer to rhetoric. He 
focuses in narratives as the core of his reasoning paradigm, which are defined as folllows: “By “narration” I mean 
symbolic actions—words and/or deeds—that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create or interpret 
them.” (p.58) 
 The narrative paradigm is widely developed and discussed in Fisher’s work, so that I am not going to to 
present it in detail. Despite that, some details and insights about it should me useful for the objective of this 
section. First of all, al last general insight about the narrative pardigm: 
  
 Under the narrative paradigm all [people] are seen as possessing equally the logic of  narration—a 
sense of coherence and fidelity. This is what is implied by the  commonplace that everyone has 
“common sense”. (p.68) 
 
 Besides that, it should seem evident that are better and worse narratives when it comes to play a role in 
reasoning and/or argumentation processes. The idea that sustains the evaluation of narratives points to its internal 
coherence and “truth”. Internal coherence is related to formal features: “the consistency of the characters and 
actions, the accomodation of auditors and so on”. (Fisher, p.75-76) 
 The so-called “truth” is a semantic matter, and deals with the relationships that connect a narrative with the 
real world. Fisher names it ‘narrative fidelity’: “fidelity to the truths that humanity shares in regard to reason, 
justice, veracity, and paceful ways to resolve social-political differences”. (p. 76) Despite this concept is more 
allied to moral values, it is similar to Teun Van Dijk’s notion of macrostructure: “ In a theory of discourse the 
notion of macrostructure […] is used to account for the various notions of global meaning, such as topic, theme, 
or gist. This implies that macrostructures in discourse are semantic objects.” (Van Dijk, 1980, p.10) 
  
 The main difference lies in that Van Dijk refers to the meaning of a narrative, while Fisher’s definition is 
about individuated meanings, potentially extractable from the narrative.  As he states, “the principle of fidelity 
pertains to the individuated components of stories—wether they represent accurate assertions about social reality 
and thereby constitute good reasons for belief or action”. (Fisher, 1989, p.105) Interpretation, which is the basis 
for semantics, is always an action of many levels. Gadamer’s views on hermeneutics are very close to this issue. 
In Truth and Method (1975) he presents an account for explaining the various meanings of a given text. Each 
meaning extracted from a given text—through its interpretation—by a given reader is conditioned by the 
associated reception conditions: those in which the reader is embodied at the moment of the reading. These 
circumstances must present some link with the text in order to allow the interpretation6. The reading 
circumstances (in Gadamer’s terms “the interpretation horizon”) may vary according to many factors, even for the 
same reader. In consequence, there is a wide variability of combinations from which a given interpretation may 
arise. This variability explains the phenomenon of the multiplicity of levels of interpretation for a given narrative. 
Associated to each level of interpretation there can be defined a set of meanings, extracted from the narrative. This 
hierarchize the relations between argumentations, narratives and internal reasons that sustains the discourse/text 
semantics I am dealing with in this paper. 
 This analysis allows the definition of “reasons”(in Fisher’s terms) associated of a given narrative. That is, the 
parts of a narrative which assessment will provide an integral level of fidelity. According to that, a reason7 can be 
defined as an element of the greater set of independent meanings potentially extractable—by a particular 
interpretation—from a given narrative. 
 An important remark is that this account of reason shoud not be confused with the one that refers to the 
reasons provided within the course of an argumentation, which can present, as it has been discused, the form of 
narratives. To avoid that misunderstanding, I will name the reasons I have just defined as ‘internal reasons’. When 
the expression ‘good reasons’—for the sake of brevity— is used, it will mean ‘good internal reasons’. 
 The standard that fundaments the evaluation of internal reasons, according to Fisher (1987), is “good 
reasons”: “those elements that provide warrants8 for accepting or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of 
communication that can be considered rhetorical”. (Fisher, 1989, p.107) 
 Internal reasons associated to the same narrative are interrelated. There might be a set of good 
reasons not properly related, so the correspondent narrative does not exhibit an acceptable level of 
fidelity. For a given narrative, the first condition for fidelity is that all its reasons are to be good reasons. 
The second condition is a proper interrelation among the internal reasons, which is assessed by the logic 
of good reasons. Fisher understands logic as “A systematic set of procedures that will aid in the analysis 
and assessment of elements of reasonings in rhetorical interactions” (p. 106), and particularizes it in a set 
of five critical questions (Fisher, 1989, p. 109). A narrative with a good degree of fidelity should answer 
properly all of it. 
 To this point, there is a set of regulative conditions (Searle, 1969) that explains how to assess 
narratives acting as reasoning devices. As it was stated in Section 3, reasonings are mental processes, 
while argumentations are communicative ones. Both are sustained by inferences. According to that, in 
order to achieve the assessment of a narrative acting as a reason in an argumentations, an adaptation of 
this set of regulative conditions has to be presented—attending to the communicative character of 
argumentations. 
 The first step consists on checking the internal coherence of the narrative, just as Fisher explains it 
for reasoning. 
 The second step is based on the evaluation of the fidelity. In order to do that, the already mentioned 
set of associated internal reasons has to be extracted from the narrative. Once this task has been fulfilled, 
the goodness of every internal reason must be tested. 
 To this point, the interrelation of the internal reasons should also be checked. To do this, an 
adaptation of Fisher’s original set of critical question will be used, so that a positive answer has to be 
obtained for each question. These are the following. 
 
 Logic of argumentative good reasons: a set of inner reasons from a given narrative is  adequately 
internally organized if the following questions can be satisfactorily  answered: 
  
1. Question of fact: What are the implicit and explicit values embedded in an internal reason? 
2. Question of relevance: Are the values appropiate to the nature of the decission the internal reason bears 
upon? 
 
6As Gadamer states: “In our analysis of the hermeneutical process we saw that to acquire a horizon of interpretation 
requires a fusion of horizons. But no text and no book speaks if it does not speak a language that reaches the other 
person. Thus interpretation must find the right language if it really wants to make the text speak. There cannot, 
therefore, be any single interpretation that is correct "in itself," precisely because every interpretation is concerned 
with the text” (p. 398) 
7The account of reason provided by Fisher does not seem precise enough (“the individuated components of stories”, 
p.105), neither collects all the insights that have been mentioned. This is why I have decided to present my own 
account of reason—internal reason—, in the presented context. 
8His account of warrant is “[any piece of communication that] authorizes, sanctions, or justifies belief, attitude, ot 
action”. (p. 107) 
3. Question of consequence: What would be the effects of adhering to to the values—for one’s concept of 
oneself, for one’s behaviour, for one’s relationships […]? 
4. Question of consistency: Are the values confirmed or validated in one’s personal experience, in the lives 
or statements of others whom one admires and respects […]? 
5. Question of trascendent issue: Are the values the message offers those that […] constitute the ideal basis 
for human conduct? 
6. Question of internal coherence: Are the values offered by each internal reason by a particular narrative 
compatible among it? 
7. Question of sequencial coherence: Are the values offered by each internal reason by each uttered 
narrative compatible among it? 
  
 Questions 1-5 are the same as Fisher’s, only with the ‘internal reasons’ expression marked in italics 
replacing ‘message’. Question 6 and 7 are particular of the presented account, and are adequatelly 
formulated due to the previous definition of internal reason. 
Question 6 refers to the local compatibility of all the internal reasons from a given narrative. It is not 
specific for argumentations; in my view it should be a neccesary condition for an internal coherence 
system like the logic of good reasons. It is not deductible from Questions 1-5, and captures de whole 
essence of the system. Question 7 refers to the communicative character of argumentations: coherence 
among reasons is a neccesary condition for a good argumentation, and it is a consequence—in the case of 
narratives working as reasons—of coherence among all internal reasons from all narratives. 
 A last issue has to be discussed. An argumentatively good narrative is the one which is composed of 
good reasons that present a logic of argumentative good reasons. It anticipates a good performance in 
justification, within an argumentative context. But, does it also make its addresee to acquire knowledge 
properly? 
 This question has been answered in Section 3, by using results about direct nd indirect judgements, 
inferential webs and chains, an so on. Now, it can be stated that an argumentatively good narrative 
provides basic knowledge or, at least, provides knowledge cooperatively along with the previously 
adduced narratives—acting as reasons—. 
 To this point, only a new remark can be added. In this paper, an epistemological externalist account 
has been hold. It defends the absence of neccesity of knowing the reliability of the source of a given 
belief in order to it becomes knowledge. But, despite this absence of neccesity, the knowledge of knowing 
can also be a matter of study, even for an externalist. And it can be obtained when the knowledge 
acquired comes from a narrative: the reliability of the source can be derived from both internal coherence 
and fidelity. A narrative presenting good levels of these indicators is presumably coming from a reliable 
source, at least it is tipically assumed9. 
 
5. On literary narratives 
 
Finally, some remarks are presented, regarding the singular character literary narratives exhibit in relation to their 
power to generate new meanings and, consequently, aditional pieces of knowledge. 
 Literary narratives exhibit a number of specific characteristics. Louis Hjelmslev (1943) highlights one of 
them: literary language and, in general, artistic language is not an exclusively denotative semiotic system but a 
connotative one. Connotation, in terms of Hjelmslev and Roland Barthes (1964)—Hjelmslev’s results on 
connotation were commented and enriched by the latter—, is explained as follows: Artistic language involves both 
signified and signifier in order to get additional meanings to the first-order denotative meaning. That is the so-
called, by Hjelmslev, ‘connotative semiotics’. In Barthes’ words: “[…] any system of significations comprises a 
plane of expression (E) and a plane of content (C) […] the signification coincides with the relation (R) of the two 
planes: ERC […] [in connotative semiotics] the first system (ERC) becomes the plane of expression, or signifier, 
of the second system: […] (ERC) R C” (Barthes, 1964, p.90). 
 Considering the points discussed so far, a deeper set of inner signifier-signified relationships arise in literary 
narratives. The denotative sign (ERC) acts as the signifier for the connotative sign ((ERC), R, C) (Gaines, 2012) 
and, in so doing, it generates an additional meaning for the narrative text: the second order, connotative one. In 
this way, additional rhetorical imports may take place based on literary texts, as they may be based on both the 
denotative and the connotative levels, loading the text with a deeper and richer set of perlocutionary meanings 
(Bermejo-Luque 2011, pp. 148-157). Accordingly, a literary narrative is potentially a source of more pieces of 
knowledge than a non-literary one. Alcaraz-León, as it was slightly mentioned in Section 2, also points out in this 
direction. She defends that the “cognitive virtues”—i.e., epistemological value—of fiction does not come from its 
 
9A justification for this last assertion could provide from an assumption that is often made subconsciously. This is 
related to integrity: a person of good narrativity should also be a person of good moral and knowledge. 
fictional character, but from the fact that fiction literature has commonly better merits—artistic, representational, 
expresive ones—than non literary narratives. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
It has been shown that knowledge acquired through narrative in argumentations can constitute basic knowledge. 
The constitutive feature of this kind of knowledge is that it does not need support from other more basic types of 
knowledge. Argumentation with narrative reasons is mainly a sequential activity, as it has been explained through 
the so-called inferential leaf-structures. Consequently, the argumentative goodness of a given narrative does not 
need to be strictly linked to its capacity to provide basic knowledge. It can also be derived from the capacity to 
provide basic knowledge of the narratives uttered previously to one. 
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